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Over fifty years after its original publication, Michel Foucault’s The Order 
of Things is still widely read, and still little understood.1 The book presents a 
sweeping overview of the history of thought from the Renaissance to the 
nineteenth century, at times hinting prophetically at an impending conceptual 
revolution that will topple the order of knowledge once again. The book’s 
many complexities have spawned as many discussions. One of the central 
questions was expressed with beautiful clarity by Jean-Luc Godard:  
Si je n’aime pas tellement Foucault, c’est parce qu’il nous 
dit: ‘a telle époque, les gens pensaient ceci ou cela, et puis à 
partir de telle date, on a pensé que...’ Moi je veux bien, mais 
est-ce qu’on peut en être aussi sûr?2  
Can you really be so sure? In other words: how does Foucault know all that 
he claims to know? This is the question we will address in this article. In 
particular, we want to know on what basis Foucault can claim that ‘in this 
epoch, people thought this or that, and then from that date on, they thought 
that…’. How does Foucault get from his sources to his results?  
A full answer to this question might perhaps be given by a detailed study 
of the notes that Foucault made during his long sessions in the Bibliothèque 
Nationale.3 This article will attempt a more modest contribution to an answer, 
arguing that Foucault does employ some bridge between his sources and his 
theory: the concept of the “historical a priori,” understood in a specific (and, 
I will argue, in the proper) sense. A proper understanding of the historical a 
priori shows that Foucault does have a method, and that there is some 
justification for his seemingly wild claims about the way in which different 
eras in history maintained different configurations of knowledge. This 
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justification has been obscured, however, by a confusion between the terms 
episteme and historical a priori. 
The Problem 
The Order of Things is an enormously ambitious book: it claims to present 
“the general configuration of knowledge”4 of different epochs, and to describe 
the ruptures in this configuration that took place around 1650 and, again, 
around 1800. Along the way, Foucault explains more specific phenomena that 
appear in the history of these epochs as surface effects of this depth structure. 
For example: in introducing the change that took place around 1800, Foucault 
casually mentions that “[t]he constitution of so many positive sciences, the 
appearance of literature, the folding back of philosophy upon its own 
development, the emergence of history as both knowledge and the mode of 
being of empiricity, are only so many signs of a deeper rupture.”5 Somehow 
or other, all these phenomena are related to a deeper rupture—one that 
“though it must be analysed, and minutely so, cannot be ‘explained’ or even 
summed up in a single word. It is a radical event that is distributed across the 
entire visible surface of knowledge, and whose signs, shocks, and effects it is 
possible to follow step by step.”6  
This ambition raises many questions. At the level of the “signs, shocks, 
and effects,” many of Foucault’s claims are unclear. For instance, the claim 
that “the appearance of literature” is a sign of this rupture (which is supposed 
to start around 17757) is puzzling: what about Shakespeare? What about 
Milton? What about Cervantes’s Don Quixote, of which Foucault earlier said 
that it “is the first modern work of literature”?8 The case of literature suggests 
a wider concern: if the aim is to establish the existence of radical breaks in 
European thought, then merely pointing at the event’s effects is insufficient. 
First, because it is not clear which of the myriad of historical phenomena that 
occur in a given period are legitimately related to the “event”; and second, 
because it is circular: it is only if we assume that there is a radical event that 
we will consider observable changes as its effects, and it is only if we consider 
observable changes as related effects that we will accept the posit of a “radical 
event.” Since all of the purported surface effects of the break can thus be 
disputed, the question arises how this “radical event” could be registered at 
all.  
This question also applies to the period between the ruptures: how can 
we gain reliable information about the deep structure of knowledge, or what 
Foucault calls the episteme of a period? An episteme is not just there for all to 
see—it is itself not a phenomenon, but something more abstract and general: 
it is a “configuration”9 or an “arrangement.”10 This sounds like a structuralist 
claim: that the totality of statements make up a system which determines the 
meaning of its parts. But Foucault’s descriptions of particular epistemes are 
not structuralist analyses of the syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations 
between elements.11 Rather, he identifies some key notions for each period 
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(resemblance and its four forms for the Renaissance, representation in terms of 
mathesis and taxonomia for the classical period, history for the modern period), 
and argues that the logic of these key notions generates many if not all of the 
particular inflections of knowledge in these periods. For instance, the play of 
resemblances is the reason why the Renaissance was so preoccupied with the 
relation between microcosm and macrocosm, as well as why it saw magic as 
part of science.12 So an episteme is somehow prior to the individual 
manifestations of scientific knowledge in a period.13  
This is one of the main reasons that The Order of Things is such an exciting 
book: it suggests the promise that it is possible to deduce a whole range of 
consequences from a basic matrix, that there is a relatively simple yet 
significant explanation for many individual forms of knowledge, and that the 
identification of a period’s episteme will light up all kinds of deep connections 
between apparently distinct fields of knowledge and culture. It is also one of 
the most extravagant claims of the book, and Foucault would later try to 
emphasize that he did not mean the claim to be as radical as it appeared.14 The 
question of how one can gain knowledge of an episteme is a key issue if we 
are to understand The Order of Things. 
 
What is an Episteme? 
Foucault admitted that the “absence of methodological signposting”15 
was one of the main problems with The Order of Things. In The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, he tried to mend the misunderstandings that this absence had 
caused. But far from being a royal road to Foucauldian archaeology, that book 
is itself a mysterious undertaking—almost a negative theology that tries to 
illuminate a method by extensively demonstrating everything that the 
method does not involve. Anyone coming to The Archaeology of Knowledge 
hoping that it will clarify The Order of Things will be in for a disappointment; 
and it is not clear to what extent the difficult work of understanding The 
Archaeology of Knowledge will give the interpreter a key to unlocking The Order 
of Things, especially since Foucault admits that the method presented in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge “includes a number of corrections and internal 
criticisms.”16  
Nevertheless, The Archaeology of Knowledge may help clarify what 
Foucault could have meant by episteme, and how he thinks an archaeologist 
can identify, (re)construct, or discover an episteme. The term enters the 
Archaeology of Knowledge towards the end of the book, in the chapter on 
knowledge and science. After giving the usual negative qualifications (an 
episteme is not a worldview, not a set of rules for knowledge), Foucault gives 
the following definition of episteme:  
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By episteme we mean, in fact, the total set of relations that 
unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give 
rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly 
formalized systems; the way in which, in each of these 
discursive formations, the transitions to 
epistemologization, scientificity, and formalization are 
situated and operate; the distribution of these thresholds, 
which may coincide, be subordinated to one another, or be 
separated by shifts in time; the lateral relations that may 
exist between epistemological figures or sciences in so far 
as they belong to neighbouring, but distinct, discursive 
practices. The episteme is [. . .] the totality of relations that 
can be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences 
when one analyses them at the level of discursive 
regularities.17 
Like most of the book, this definition is heavy on jargon and requires a 
lot of unpacking to really be comprehensible; but the last sentence can point 
us in the right direction: if the episteme is “the totality of relations . . . between 
the sciences,” that means that one could reconstruct an episteme by a 
juxtaposition and comparison of different sciences—either by induction over 
a number of particular fields of science, or by some kind of structural analysis 
where the minimum units of comparison are sciences rather than statements. 
If the bold claims about the “classical period” and the “modern period” in The 
Order of Things amount to claims about the relations between sciences in those 
periods, the accounts of episteme could be based on a generalization of the 
fields of science that Foucault has studied for these periods.  
If we want to take this suggestion seriously, the next question is how 
exactly one establishes “the totality of relations . . . between the sciences when 
one analyses them at the level of discursive regularities.” This formulation 
seems to require treating the “sciences” as discrete units that come into 
external contact with each other. But since modern Western science (that is, 
the kind of science Foucault was primarily interested in) is inherently a 
practice of debate, mutual criticism, and productive disagreement, it is hard 
to see how it would be possible to treat the different sciences as a unity: 
contradictory theories can and do coexist at any phase of science. The addition 
that this analysis takes place at the level of discursive regularities is helpful in 
excluding many relations that might otherwise have seemed relevant—e.g., 
the fact that the humanist Wilhelm von Humboldt and the naturalist 
Alexander von Humboldt were brothers means that there is a concrete 
relationship between their two disciplines, but since this relation is not 
situated at the level of “discursive regularities,” it does not come into 
consideration for someone trying to reconstruct a period’s episteme. 
Moreover, the phrase “discursive regularities” promises to resolve the 
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apparent disunity of fields of science in some way, so that we can safely treat 
“sciences” as unities. But how does this work?  
 
What Is a Historical A Priori? 
In this section, I will argue that the concept of “historical a priori,” when 
understood in a certain way, does precisely the work of enabling Foucault to 
treat fields of science as unities, and thus to reconstruct the level of an 
episteme. I will have to discuss this concept at some length because my 
reading is a significant departure from the standard readings of Foucault.  
There appears to be an overwhelming consensus that historical a priori is 
more or less synonymous with episteme. A small sample: The Wikipedia 
lemma for “episteme” (an expression of the vox populi if ever there was one) 
states that “Michel Foucault used the term épistème in a highly specialized 
sense in his work The Order of Things to mean the historical a priori that 
grounds knowledge and its discourses and thus represents the condition of 
their possibility within a particular epoch.”18 Oksala writes that “episteme 
refers to the historical a priori of an epoch.”19 Han-Pile, in her exemplary study 
of the Kantian and critical themes in Foucault's work, states that Foucault 
employs the terms episteme and historical a priori “in an interchangeable 
manner in The Order of Things,” and talks of “the concept of the historical a 
priori, which [Foucault] assimilates in [The Order of Things] to that of the 
épistémè.”20 Hyder considers the epistemes as the “most obvious examples of 
[. . .] historical a prioris in Foucault’s work.”21 A special issue of the Continental 
History Review on “Historical a Priori in Husserl and Foucault” (March 2016) 
also shows that this is the dominant reading: in their introduction to the issue, 
Aldea and Allen say that Foucault attempted “to tell the story of the 
emergence of the modern historical a priori”22 (Foucault more typically speaks 
of the modern episteme); and some of the contributions assume that the 
historical a priori is something like the set of conditions of possibility for 
knowledge in a given epoch, more or less identical with the episteme.23  
It is not hard to see why readers of Foucault are led to equate the two 
terms: an episteme determines the historically changeable conditions of 
possibility for knowledge of a given period. There is a long tradition in 
philosophy of calling something’s conditions of possibility its a priori; 
combine that with the fact that the particular conditions of possibility singled 
out by the term episteme are historically changeable, and you can see that 
historical a priori would not have been a bad name for the episteme. But I will 
argue that this is a mistake: in fact, Foucault does not use the term historical a 
priori interchangeably with episteme.  
A good indication that the terms are not interchangeable is that an 
attempt to actually substitute one term for the other fails in almost all cases. 
For one, a historical a priori is almost always indexed to a field of science, 
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rather than to a period. There is a “historical a priori of a science of living 
beings,”24 a “historical a priori of the human sciences,”25 and a “historical and 
concrete a priori of the modern medical gaze,”26 but in Foucault’s usage there 
is never a historical a priori of, say, the classical period. The failure of 
substitution is even clearer the other way around: it would make no sense in 
Foucault’s jargon to talk about “the episteme of a science of living beings.” This 
observation alone shows that the standard reading needs to be corrected.  
Both in The Order of Things and in The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault 
invokes the historical a priori of a science to argue that, in spite of 
disagreements between individual scientists, there is a level of unity in every 
scientific field that allows for disagreements to take place within the same 
field. To take a (non-Foucauldian) example: a quantitative and a qualitative 
sociologist may disagree strongly about the appropriate way to study society, 
but they will usually still agree on enough to both consider the other as 
contributing to an enterprise called “sociology.” In The Order of Things, 
Foucault raises this issue in relation to eighteenth-century natural history:  
There were doubtless, in this region we now term life, many 
inquiries other than attempts at classification, many kinds 
of analysis other than that of identities and differences. But 
they all rested upon a sort of historical a priori, which 
authorized them in their dispersion and in their singular 
and divergent projects, and rendered equally possible all 
the differences of opinion of which they were the source.27  
Below the level of differences, divergences and dispersions, the historical a 
priori is the ground of unity that ensures that all eighteenth-century attempts 
at describing the order of nature belong to the same field. 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge, the chapter on “The Historical a priori and 
the Archive” opens with a discussion of the issue of unity and dispersal of 
science: “The positivity of a discourse—like that of Natural History, political 
economy, or clinical medicine—characterizes its unity throughout time, and 
well beyond individual oeuvres, books, and texts.”28 This positivity reveals 
“the extent to which Buffon and Linnaeus (or Turgot and Quesnay, Broussais 
and Bichat) were talking about ‘the same thing,’ by placing themselves ‘at the 
same level’ or at ‘the same distance,’ by deploying ‘the same conceptual field,’ 
by opposing one another on ‘the same field of battle.’”29 Again, the function 
of the technical term “historical a priori” is to serve as the principle of unity 
underlying a field of knowledge, even when there is disagreement and battle 
within this field.  
My contention is that this is the core meaning of historical a priori 
everywhere that Foucault uses it, from the Birth of the Clinic to The Archaeology 
of Knowledge: we can tentatively define Foucault’s historical a priori as “the 
principle of unity of a field of science.”30  
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This is also more or less what Edmund Husserl means by historical a 
priori in the short text The Origin of Geometry, which commentators have 
pointed out is the first use of the phrase historical a priori in the philosophical 
tradition. 31 I claim that Foucault did not just use Husserl’s phrase, but took 
over the specialized concept of historical a priori from Husserl more or less 
wholesale. This is not to say that Foucault’s historical a priori is simply the 
same as Husserl’s. For one, unlike Husserl’s historical a priori, which is the 
unchangeable invariant undercurrent of a scientific tradition, Foucault’s 
historical a priori is, paradoxically, both invariant (within a given period) and 
historically changeable (in breaks between periods). Moreover, while 
Husserl’s notion of a historical a priori is embedded in a phenomenological 
approach to the history of scientific pursuits, Foucault’s is more formalistic. I 
will have more to say on these differences later. The key point that I want to 
make here, though, is that the basic idea behind the historical a priori is the 
same in Husserl as in Foucault: a historical a priori is the set of conditions 
under which divergent theories, observations and concepts can nevertheless 
be said to belong to the same scientific pursuit.  
 
From Husserl to Foucault 
The connection between Foucault’s and Husserl’s historical a priori is 
historically plausible: it is certain that Foucault knew and read Husserl’s 
paper at least as early as 1963, the year after Derrida’s translation of and 
commentary to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry was published.32 In January of 
1963, Foucault wrote Derrida a letter to thank him for the translation and 
commentary, stating that he “read it—and re-read it.”33 In April of that year, 
Foucault’s Birth of the Clinic was published;34 towards the end of that book, he 
sums up the transformation he has described as the establishment of “the 
historical and concrete a priori of the modern medical gaze,”35 which is a 
striking echo of Husserl’s phrase “concrete, historical a priori.”36 Although in 
the Birth of the Clinic, unlike in the Order of Things, the concept of a historical a 
priori does not do any theoretical heavy lifting, the link with Husserl already 
seems to be present there.  
A short discussion of Husserl’s Origin of Geometry, and more particularly 
of the role of a historical a priori in it, is in place here. Like the Crisis of the 
European Sciences for which it was a sketch, The Origin of Geometry is concerned 
with the relation between the meaningful reality of everyday life (Lebenswelt) 
and the formalizations of modern science. In the essay, Husserl introduces a 
schematic overview of the derivation of geometry from the life world via the 
notions of historicity and tradition.  
In a pretheoretical state, the subject is confronted with certain self-
evidences: intuitions about the nature of lines, surfaces, and solids that form 
the first primitive geometry. The scientific tradition is born at the moment 
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people start writing down these self-evidences so as to be able to share them 
with others. This means that a more advanced elaboration of self-evidences 
becomes possible, and that the “ideal objects” of geometry, such as 
Pythagoras’s theorem, acquire an objectivity that is independent of the minds 
of individual geometers. Pythagoras’s theorem exists only once, but is re-
activated when it is spoken, thought or written down: it exists through its 
“sensibly embodying repetitions.”37 Once it has been written down, the 
theorem remains in existence even if there is nobody around to think it. This 
is the origin of the reality of ideal objects, and the origin of science.  
But this origin engenders the risk that the writings take on a life of their 
own: they can be considered as evidence independently of the intuitive self-
evidence they were supposed to communicate. This is the situation in which 
one learns every definition and proposition of Euclid’s Elements by heart, 
without working one’s way through them to reactivate their self-evidence in 
consciousness. Once this possibility is realized, science starts drifting away 
from the Lebenswelt towards the sterility typical of modern mathematics and 
physics. Husserl interprets the situation in the science of his time as precisely 
this detaching and drifting off of the sciences. As he puts it, we have lost the 
“capacity for reactivating the original activities contained within [geometry’s] 
fundamental concepts,” and “without the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of its 
prescientific materials, geometry [is] a tradition empty of meaning.”38  
Once the drifting off has started, how can one get back to the pre-
theoretical origins of geometry? This is where Husserl’s concept of historical 
a priori enters the scene. For any tradition to be possible, there must be some 
invariants that tie all successive stages of the tradition together, uniting it into 
a single tradition. The set of these invariants is what Husserl calls “the 
universal a priori of history.”39 We can methodically study the historical a 
priori by starting from the structure of our present, which is disclosed to us, 
and then perform a “free variation” in the imagination, allowing us to 
discover what is necessarily common to each stage of history, past or 
present.40 In the case of geometry, this variation leads to the discovery of just 
those primary prescientific self-evidences that gave birth to geometry, and 
that came to be forgotten in modern science. The examples Husserl gives of 
these historical a priori structures are of the following type: “that it was a 
world of ‘things’ . . . that all things necessarily had to have a bodily character 
. . . that these pure bodies had spatio-temporal shapes and ‘material’ qualities 
. . .  related to them,” and that “we can always suppose some measuring 
technique, whether of a lower or higher type.”41 These are some of the 
invariant presuppositions underlying the complete tradition of geometry 
from Thales to Euclid through Galileo up to the present, by virtue of which 
we can reactivate the original sense-constructions of the first geometers. 
Although Husserl sees the historical a priori primarily as the invariant 
structures of historicity in general (the structures that underlie every historical 
series of variations), the Origin of Geometry zeroes in on those structures that 
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guarantee the unity of the tradition of a particular field of science. And while 
Husserl happens to focus on the field of geometry, he repeatedly makes it 
clear that the same could hold for any other scientific discipline.42  
The historical a priori in the Husserlian sense (which I claim is also the 
Foucauldian sense) is thus very close to Kuhn’s notion of a “paradigm.” It is 
the common set of assumptions by virtue of which a group of scientists can 
be said to work in the same field, talk about the same things and be concerned 
with the same problems. The comparison to Kuhn has its limits, of course. For 
Husserl (though not for Foucault), a historical a priori is absolutely invariant, 
while the whole point of paradigms is that they change. Moreover, Kuhn 
primarily conceived of paradigms as examples rather than rules:43 people 
working in the “Newtonian paradigm” are people for whom Newton’s work 
is the prime example of good science, and whose interests therefore gravitate 
towards Newton-like problems, Newton-like methods, and Newton-like 
solutions. Paradigms are thus sociological facts, rather than epistemological 
configurations. The historical a priori of Husserl and Foucault, on the other 
hand, is transcendental rather than sociological. But the comparison is 
enlightening nevertheless: it suggests that the historical a priori can be 
conceived of as a vital tool in understanding the history of knowledge, rather 
than just an abstruse piece of phenomenological jargon.  
It is worth mentioning here that the “historical” in historical a priori does 
not mean “historically changeable” (as the standard reading of Foucault 
would have it), but indicates that this is the a priori that grounds history. For 
Husserl, it is important that this a priori be stable throughout the centuries so 
as to guarantee the unity of a tradition—it is the set of invariants that unite 
the tradition throughout its history; but there is nothing in principle that 
prevents a tradition from breaking down and a new one from taking its place. 
In that case, both these traditions would have their separate historical a priori 
that underpin their internal unity as long as the tradition lasts, but they do not 
persist throughout all of time. This is just how Foucault takes the concept: not 
a trans- or suprahistorical set of conditions that persist throughout history, 
but a set of conditions that unify a single field for as long as it lasts.  
Foucault’s innovation with respect to Husserl is not that Foucault first 
made the a priori historical.44 Instead, the innovation is that Foucault made 
the historical a priori into something contingent that can break down and start 
anew (though as we shall see, Foucault was not the first to propose this). The 
historical a priori is thus “historical” in two senses. In the primary Husserlian 
sense, it is “the a priori of history”: a set of invariant conditions that bring 
together dispersed theories into a single tradition. But for Foucault, these sets 
of conditions are historical in a second sense: they can be observed to change, 
topple, and mutate, to the point where people in different periods of time can 
ostensibly be talking about the same objects (like animals or words), but in 
fact be engaged in a completely different tradition. Foucault’s historical a 
priori is one step closer to Kuhn’s paradigm, in being both the condition of 
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unity within a period, as well as the locus of dramatic change between 
periods.  
 
Consciousness or Concept? 
So far, I have argued that the function of the historical a priori is the same 
in Husserl as in Foucault: to guarantee the unity of a field of science. But it has 
been argued that one of the key differences between Husserl and Foucault is 
what the historical a priori consists in—the epistemological and ontological 
status of the conditions that guarantee the unity of a tradition. Hyder gives 
the following account of the difference:  
Foucault’s historical a priori differs from Husserl’s in that 
it does not describe the framework of past intentional acts. 
It is instead supposed to be the framework that made 
possible the formation of past énoncés, or statements, which 
are to be identified and analyzed without any reference to 
the conscious intentions of individual speakers.45  
This reading stems from a line of inquiry that sees Foucault’s 
appropriation of Husserl as mediated by the French school of historical 
epistemology, and in particular, by the work of Jean Cavaillès.46 Cavaillès’s 
criticism and reworking of Husserl prefigures Foucault’s archaeology in 
important ways. Cavaillès criticizes Husserl for the latter’s inability to 
conceptualize scientific developments; as Thompson puts it, Cavaillès 
modifies phenomenology “precisely so as to be able to get at the profoundly 
eruptive historicity of science itself.”47 This historicity, for Cavaillès, is a 
historicity not just of different theories built on an invariant framework, but 
rather, a historicity of the transcendental itself. In other words, it is not a 
tradition constantly underpinned by the same a priori foundations, but a 
process where the conceptual framework itself changes.  
This injection of the historical into the transcendental implies a 
fundamental change in outlook: while Husserl’s historical a priori consisted 
of intentional acts of consciousness that can be reactivated and retraced, 
Cavaillès suggests that at different stages of science, “it is not the same 
consciousness” that is at work.48 This means that for Cavaillès, it is not 
consciousness that is the bedrock of scientific history, but rather a dialectic at 
the level of concepts. As he puts it, “it is not a philosophy of consciousness 
but a philosophy of the concept that can provide a theory of science.”49 
This rejection of a philosophy of consciousness will of course become part 
of Foucault’s project later on. And in the account from The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, Foucault goes a long way towards eliminating consciousness from 
his methodology. Thompson and Hyder both base their accounts of 
Foucault’s inheritance Cavaillès on readings of The Archaeology of Knowledge 
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for this reason. But it is much less clear that this holds for The Order of Things, 
where, I argue, Foucault vacillates between a Husserl-style philosophy of 
consciousness and a Cavaillès-style philosophy of the concept.50  
Consider this passage, the most explicit account of the inner workings of 
the historical a priori that Foucault gives in The Order of Things: 
This a priori is what, in a given period, delimits in the 
totality of experience a field of knowledge, defines the 
mode of being of the objects that appear in that field, 
provides man’s everyday perception with theoretical 
powers, and defines the conditions in which he can sustain 
a discourse about things that is recognized to be true. In the 
eighteenth century, the historical a priori that provided the 
basis for inquiry into or controversy about the existence of 
genera, the stability of species, and the transmission of 
characters from generation to generation, was the existence 
of a natural history: the organization of a certain visible 
existence as a domain of knowledge, the definition of the 
four variables of description, the constitution of an area of 
adjacencies in which any individual being whatever can 
find its place. Natural history in the Classical age is not 
merely the discovery of a new object of curiosity; it covers 
a series of complex operations that introduce the possibility 
of a constant order into a totality of representations. It 
constitutes a whole domain of empiricity as at the same 
time describable and orderable.51 
This passage consists of two parts: a general description of the historical a 
priori, and a more specific description of the a priori for eighteenth-century 
natural history. The first part consists of four functions of the historical a 
priori, plus the (anti-Husserlian?) caveat that this holds “in a given period.” 
According to Foucault, the historical a priori  
(a) delimits in the totality of experience a field of knowledge 
(b) defines the mode of being of the objects that appear in that field 
(c) provides man’s everyday perception with theoretical powers 
(d) defines the conditions in which he can sustain a discourse about 
things that is recognized to be true.  
Of these four functions, (a) and (b) clearly belong to the “philosophy of 
consciousness” rather than to the “philosophy of the concept.” Moreover, (a)–
(c) are all formulations that are alien to The Archaeology of Knowledge: appeals 
to “the totality of experience,” the “mode of being” of objects, or “man’s 
everyday perception” do not fit the discourse-oriented approach Foucault 
would later take. Condition (d) is the only one that Foucault would not 
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repudiate in later works; in fact, the conditions for true discourse become the 
linchpin of the “late archaeology” of The Archaeology of Knowledge and “The 
Order of Discourse.”  
In the specific description of the historical a priori of natural history, the 
situation looks more Cavaillèsian:  
α. the organization of a certain visible existence as a domain 
of knowledge 
β. the definition of the four variables of description 
γ. the constitution of an area of adjacencies in which any 
individual being whatever can find its place. 
Although α, in focusing on visible existence, suggests a consciousness-based 
definition of a field of science, β and γ are both abstract and conceptual in 
nature. We will discuss this passage in greater detail below, but for now, 
suffice it to say that this quotation suggests that in The Order of Things Foucault 
is somewhere between Husserl and Cavaillès. He vacillates between a 
consciousness-based approach to the historical a priori (where the historical a 
priori consists of structures of experience) and a concept-based approach 
(where it consists of a terminology of description, a grid for ordering, or a 
form of discourse).  
We should be careful to separate the question of what Foucault actually 
does in The Order of Things from what Foucault ought to be doing. The 
tradition of Cavaillès is clearly better suited to Foucault’s project than the 
Husserlian heritage. The obvious problem with any reliance on a philosophy 
of consciousness is that it will also rely on the empirical-transcendental 
doublet of “man” that Foucault will go on to criticize in the final chapters of 
The Order of Things. The Husserlian notion of the historical a priori would 
anchor the archaeological project in a philosophy of consciousness, relegating 
it to the status of a mere byproduct of the modern episteme, and dooming it 
to the same methodological instability that haunts the human sciences. This 
makes The Order of Things self-defeating. It makes sense, then, that Foucault 
would change tack when developing the methodology in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge. But the Foucault of The Order of Things seems to be stuck between 
the two positions: sometimes simply historicizing Husserl’s intentional acts, 
and sometimes making a more elaborate conceptual argument along the lines 
of Cavaillès.  
 
Test Case: From Natural History to the Classical Episteme 
Bracketing for a moment the vexed question of the epistemological and 
ontological status of the historical a priori, we can try to reconstruct how the 
archaeologist can get knowledge of an episteme. If, as we have seen, an 
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episteme consists of the relations between fields of science considered “at the 
level of discursive regularities,” and if the historical a priori of any science is 
its principle of unity, or “the group of rules that characterize a discursive 
practice,”52 we may conjecture that studying the historical a priori of different 
sciences will get us some way towards mapping out an episteme. If a historical 
a priori gives us the discursive regularity that unites a science, the relations 
between historical a prioris could constitute an episteme. We will now try to 
see how this might work by taking Foucault’s treatment of natural history in 
the eighteenth century as a test case.  
One of the many provocative claims of The Order of Things is that there 
was no biology in the eighteenth century: 
Historians want to write histories of biology in the 
eighteenth century; but they do not realize that biology did 
not exist then, and that the pattern of knowledge that has 
been familiar to us for a hundred and fifty years is not valid 
for a previous period. And that, if biology was unknown, 
there was a very simple reason for it: that life itself did not 
exist. All that existed was living beings, which were viewed 
through a grid of knowledge constituted by natural 
history.53 
In the chapter on the historical a priori in The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
Foucault recapitulates this provocation by saying that “one cannot say that 
Darwin is talking about the same thing as Diderot,” even though both hold 
that species are formed by mutations from generation to generation.54 
We can rephrase the claim that Darwin is not talking about the same 
thing as Diderot by saying that the historical a priori of a science of living 
things is different in Darwin’s time than in Diderot’s time. That is why Darwin 
is somehow “closer” to his contemporaries who disagreed with him than to 
his supposed “predecessor” Diderot who might have agreed with his central 
insight. That is also why it is not right to speak of an eighteenth century 
science of “biology”: the conditions that define the unity of the field of biology 
did not hold sway over eighteenth century studies of nature.  
Foucault does not just claim that biology did not exist in the eighteenth 
century; he also claims that there is a “very simple reason” for this: “that life 
itself did not exist. All that existed was living beings, which were viewed 
through a grid of knowledge constituted by natural history.”55 The difference 
between the two sciences comes down to a difference between “life” on the 
one hand and “living beings as viewed through natural history” on the other, 
the former being characteristic of “biology” and the latter of eighteenth-
century studies of nature. Later in the same chapter, Foucault pins a name to 
these characteristics: it is the historical a priori of these inquiries. This quote, 
which we discussed above, is worth repeating in this context:  
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In the eighteenth century, the historical a priori that 
provided the basis for inquiry into or controversy about the 
existence of genera, the stability of species, and the 
transmission of characters from generation to generation, 
was the existence of a natural history: the organization of a 
certain visible existence as a domain of knowledge, the 
definition of the four variables of description, the 
constitution of an area of adjacencies in which any 
individual being whatever can find its place. [. . .] What 
makes it akin to theories of language also distinguishes it 
from what we have understood, since the nineteenth 
century, by biology, and causes it to play a certain critical 
role in Classical thought.56 
The existence of natural history (and more particularly, what we earlier called 
functions (α) – (γ)) is the historical a priori that unites divergent inquiries into 
one field, and that sets it apart from the nineteenth century’s way of thinking 
about living things.  
I want to emphasize two points in the preceding quote. First, Foucault 
gives us a relatively detailed picture of what this historical a priori looks like: 
it is the organization of a visible existence as a domain of knowledge (i.e., the 
fact that visible surfaces, rather than depths or functions, that are the relevant 
data when studying living beings;57 the definition of the four variables of 
description;58 and the constitution of an area of adjacencies, i.e., the ideal of 
drawing up a table in the style of Linnaeus.59 These are all crucial features of 
natural history, that Foucault has apparently distilled from the sources in the 
preceding chapter. This gives an indication of how an archaeologist could 
identify the historical a priori of a field (although it bears repeating that the 
ontological and epistemological status is far from consistent or clear 
throughout The Order of Things).  
The second point to emphasize is that this set of conditions of unity for 
the science of natural history is, at the same time, “what makes it akin to 
theories of language”: Foucault’s claim is not merely that there is some kind 
of affinity between natural history and general grammar, but that the two are 
fundamentally related in such a way that it is viable to describe them as being 
based on the same configuration of thought, or as informed by the same 
episteme. In this passage, we get a glimpse of the nature of this fundamental 
relation: it is a relation of one historical a priori to another. Read in light of the 
definition of episteme in The Archaeology of Knowledge, this passage thus 
suggests that Foucault does employ a kind of bottom-up analysis: from the 
sources (texts of scientists), to the conditions of unity for the field that they 
belong to (historical a priori), to the relations between these conditions for 
different scientific fields (episteme). This is certainly not the order of 
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presentation that Foucault uses in The Order of Things, but it is plausible that 
this is the order of discovery.  
The question of the relationship of priority between the historical a priori 
and the episteme in The Order of Things remains obscure. In The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, Foucault moves in the direction of nominalism: archaeology starts 
with discursive practices, constructs a historical a priori from discursive 
regularities, and finally constructs an episteme from the relations between 
sciences. The suggestion that the episteme has a reality over and above 
statements is absent from The Archaeology of Knowledge. In The Order of Things, 
though, Foucault is much less cautious. This is especially apparent in his 
accounts of the breaks between epistemes, where he calls discursive events 
“only so many signs of a deeper rupture.”60 When we look at the breaks 
between epistemes, an important question is whether this is also the causal 
order. Do the simultaneous changes in the historical a priori of different fields 
of inquiry cause the episteme to topple? Does a change in episteme cause the 
historical a priori to change? Or does a change in episteme amount to nothing 
more than a simultaneous change in historical a priori for a number of 
disciplines? On this issue of causation, archaeology is notoriously silent, and 
it is not clear that a better conception of the internal structure of an episteme 
would make the breaks between different epistemes any less mysterious. But 
Foucault’s prose in The Order of Things often suggests that he thinks of the 
episteme as the deeper reality, and individual sciences and discourses as mere 
surface effects, suggesting an ontological priority for the episteme. 
Later in The Order of Things, when discussing the break that took place in 
the Western episteme around 1800, Foucault again invokes the historical a 
priori of natural history as a key factor in the break: “[The dominant principle] 
is no longer that of the possibilities of being, it is that of the conditions of life. 
The whole historical a priori of a science of living beings is thus overthrown 
and then renewed.”61 The introduction of the idea of “life” in Cuvier’s studies 
meant that the invisible interior drives and forces of the organism suddenly 
became a part of the science of living things which up to that point had been 
concerned mostly with the external surfaces of creatures. This made the old 
study of surfaces and taxonomical relations largely obsolete, and thus 
spawned a whole new way of thinking about living beings—guided by the 
notion of “life.” The historical a priori of this science changes so drastically 
that it does not make sense to say that Darwin and Diderot are talking about 
the same thing.  
The condition of unity for biology, then, is an interest in the living being 
as an expression of the deeper drive of life. Independently of this discussion, 
Foucault has also found out that, from Adam Smith on, the theory of value 
changes: value is no longer the surface effect of a commodity, but an 
expression of the deeper investment of labor.62 And in the study of words, the 
interest in inflections has suggested the idea that, beyond the intentions of 
speakers and the references of words, grammar is an expression of a deeper 
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history of language.63 These three changes in three different historical a prioris 
take place at about the same time and have a strong structural similarity: in 
each of the cases, the interest shifts from visible surfaces to invisible depths. 
This is therefore a reason for saying that the episteme itself changes at this 
moment. If we use as our criterion the description of The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, this looks like good archaeological practice: start with discursive 
practices, uncover their regularities, and when the relations between those 
regularities look significant, it becomes possible to make some claims about 
what happens at the level of the episteme. 
Here again, a comparison with Thomas Kuhn can be useful. Kuhn’s claim 
that different sciences adopt different paradigms at different periods in their 
histories is very close to Foucault’s claim that the historical a priori of a science 
can be “overthrown and then renewed.”64 To understand Foucault’s more 
radical and esoteric claims about the changes at the large-scale level of an 
episteme, we can do a thought experiment: suppose that Kuhn had found in 
his research, not just that sciences sometimes change paradigms, but that at 
some moments in history, a number of sciences suddenly change paradigms 
at the same time and in structurally similar ways, without any clear reason 
why they should do so. Had Kuhn’s research pushed him in that direction, he 
might very well have started to entertain speculations about deep changes in 
the configuration of Western thought. Whether he would have followed those 
speculations with the same vehemence as Foucault did is an open question. 
But the comparison shows, I hope, that Foucault’s claims about epistemes 
need not be as esoteric or metaphysical as they look at a first glance.  
 
Concluding Remarks  
At this point, our original question is more or less resolved: we wanted 
to know by what path or method an archaeological historian could gain access 
to the level of the episteme, and have found that the conditions of unity for 
sciences can serve as a bridge between the particular sources and the highly 
general level of the episteme. This has helped us make some sense of what 
Foucault talks about when he talks about an episteme. Although the exact 
method he uses for determining the historical a priori of a science is not quite 
clear, at least this is a less mysterious exercise than describing an episteme, 
and a comparison with Thomas Kuhn has helped us demystify Foucault 
somewhat.  
At the same time, we must admit that Foucault’s early work cannot be 
completely demystified: there is still a lot of obscure and obscurantist 
metaphysico-literary prose, and even in the more comprehensible passages 
Foucault sometimes makes claims that seem unwarranted and hard to 
uphold. The differences between The Order of Things and The Archaeology of 
Knowledge remain an obstacle to really understanding what Foucault is up to 
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in the former work. Maybe we have succeeded in making the episteme 
slightly less mysterious, but our account does not explain, for example, how 
the episteme could influence the forms that creative literature takes, or how 
the episteme could spontaneously generate the “human sciences,” as Foucault 
claims it can. So whether Foucault is worth emulating or criticizing is still an 
open question at this point and there is still work to be done in interpreting 
Foucault’s early work. 
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